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vThese comprise what he calls the politics of 
distraction.
What does this mean for practical action? 
What should we do? This is something that 
John considers in a second paper that focuses 
on the notion of collaborative expertise. I 
hope that the important messages in this 
companion paper will be heard loud and clear.
To my mind, there is also a more general ques-
tion of how practical action – across all fields 
– should respond to an existing evidence base. 
This is something that John and I have debated 
in public and private, and our views are not 
identical.
Having played a significant role in policy-making 
in England, and having advised government on 
education policy from time to time, I have felt 
and experienced some of the dilemmas John 
describes. I learnt that purely evidence-based 
policy is neither desirable nor possible. This is 
not an argument for ignoring the evidence. 
On the contrary, every decision should take 
available evidence into account. There are 
three problems with a purely evidence-based 
approach though. One is that the evidence is 
not always clear-cut and is often the subject 
of vigorous debate – which is healthy, but it 
doesn’t make it any easier to reach conclusions.
Another is that in a fast-moving world, 
policy- makers often have to innovate, and, 
Few, if any, academics have made as great a 
contribution to our collective knowledge base 
about what works in education as John Hattie. 
His painstaking meta-analysis of literally tens of 
thousands of academic studies on education 
interventions resulted in his now justly famous 
book, Visible Learning, which he has since fol-
lowed up with others.
While many of the academic papers he has 
reviewed show a particular education inter-
vention to have a positive effect (as John 
memorably puts it, ‘perhaps all you need to 
enhance learning is a pulse!’), he has made the 
case that unless an intervention has an effect 
size of 0.4 or greater (the average expected 
growth effect size for one year of progress 
in school), it would be unwise to base deci-
sion-making on it. In other words, John asks 
for more impact for our effort, and he has 
identified the relatively few ideas that pass this 
benchmark at a classroom level.
In this new paper, the first of two, he ad-
dresses the question of what this search for 
more impact means, and he does two things 
powerfully. The first is to make the case that 
the minimum goal of education, when rightly 
expressed, should be for all students to make 
at least one year’s progress for one year’s 
input, no matter where they start. The second 
is to argue that at the level of public policy 
there are many ideas, many of them popular 
and plausible, which do not pass the 0.4 test. 
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As with every piece in Pearson’s thought- 
leadership series, John’s papers represent an 
important, independent voice in our global 
conversation on education. Using the evi-
dence that he has amassed over the course 
of his incredibly generative career, John has 
produced a provocative synthesis that will 
challenge thinking along all points of the pol-
itical spectrum. Although John’s papers won’t 
answer every question (and, indeed, they will 
raise quite a few more), they do provide an 
unmatched summary of the baseline know-
ledge every education policy-maker should 
have. And, if these papers become a starting 
point from which policy-makers build their 
knowledge about what does and does not 
work, the result is certain to be policy that is 
better informed and more effective.
As it happens, the papers are also an excellent 
read.
Michael Barber
by definition, there will not be conclusive 
evidence either way on an innovation. For ex-
ample, while I agree that promoting choice can 
be a distraction, I believe that genuine choice 
will become a powerful lever for getting us 
closer to John’s goal of every student making a 
year’s worth of progress for a year’s worth of 
input. (For example, another recent entry into 
the Pearson thought leadership catalogue by 
Tooley and Longfield [2015], makes the case 
that choice over schools really does matter in 
the developing world.)
The third is that ideology is not always bad: 
we elect governments partly on the policies 
they set out in a campaign but partly also on 
the broad view of the world they espouse. For 
example, it is perfectly plausible to be for or 
against choice on ideological grounds (i.e. to 
believe that choice is or is not a good thing 
in itself). For these reasons, I would argue for 
evidence-informed policy rather than evi-
dence-based policy.
1a difference, despite costing many billions of 
dollars. Such responses are part of what I call 
the ‘politics of distraction’.
In a subsequent paper, I will make the case 
for countries moving to systems that value 
and develop teacher expertise. This might be 
termed the politics of collaborative expertise, 
or, more simply, what works best. My hope is 
that these two papers spark a debate about 
the need, and then the actions required, to 
realign the narrative around schooling.
In this report, the first of two linked papers 
on what doesn’t work in education, and then 
on what does, I describe the confused jargon 
and narratives that distract us from the most 
ambitious and vital aim of schooling: for every 
student to gain at least a year’s growth for a 
year’s input.
I then outline the policy responses commonly 
used by systems aspiring to be in the world’s 
‘top five’ for education. I argue that these 
responses are ‘fixes’ that fail to address the im-
portant questions, and so are unlikely to make 
INTRODUCTION
for teachers, setting standards, privileging a few 
subjects, more assessments, more technology, 
lower class size, greater school choice, or 
longer school days, to list just a few.
These are typically expensive proposals, which 
the evidence shows have minimal effect on 
improving student learning. These distract us 
from implementing policies that can make a 
significant difference, defined here as inter-
ventions with an effect size of at least 0.4, the 
average expected effect size for one year of 
progress in school.This commitment to the 
commonly heard list of fixes is part of the 
politics of distraction.
In my travels I have met with many political 
leaders and department officials and continue 
to be impressed with their commitment to 
improving their education systems, their desire 
to make them world-leading and their dedi-
cation to improving outcomes for students. 
But they struggle to have the hard, somewhat 
uncomfortable discussions about the variabil-
ity in the effectiveness of what happens at the 
classroom level and instead focus on policies 
which are politically attractive but which have 
been shown to have little effect on improving 
student learning – structural ‘fixes’ such as 
more money, different forms of schooling, 
different types of buildings, performance pay 
1. WASTED GOOD INTENTIONS
2problem. The evidence from many decades 
of research on what really enhances student 
learning reflects this and points to solutions 
such as improving teacher and school leader 
expertise, ensuring that teachers and school 
leaders work together on common under-
standings about progress and high expect-
ations for the impact of their teaching, school 
leaders who focus on developing collective 
expertise among their teachers, systems that 
have robust discussions to decide the purpose 
and desired outcomes of their schools and 
students who want to learn the skills they 
need to become their own teachers.
These policies, less frequently heard, could be 
termed ‘the politics of collaborative expertise’, 
because it is only by resourcing and privil eging 
collaborative expertise that a nation can 
have any chance of becoming one of the top 
education systems in the world. Recognising, 
valuing and enhancing the teachers and school 
leaders with high levels of expertise makes the 
difference. It’s what works best.
Many systems are imbued with high levels of 
such expertise, but it is all at risk if the politics 
of distraction command the limelight.
To date, too much discussion is focused on 
between-school differences when the great-
est issue is the differences within schools. 
The variance between schools, based on the 
2009 PISA results for reading across all OECD 
countries, is 36 per cent, and variance within 
schools is 64 per cent. For Australia, it is 18 
and 72 per cent; Canada, 20 and 80 per cent; 
Finland, 8 and 92 per cent; New Zealand, 16 
and 84 per cent; the UK, 24 and 76 per cent; 
Sweden, 9 and 91 per cent; and the USA, 30 
and 70 per cent.1
There are many causes of this variance within 
schools, but one of the more important (and 
one that we have some influence to reduce) 
is the variability in the effectiveness of teach-
ers. This does not mean that all teachers are 
bad; it means that there is much variability 
among teachers in the effect that they have 
on student learning. Nearly all teachers, school 
leaders, students and parents know about this 
variability – although it is too often absent in 
discussions about policy, teaching and schools. 
Such discussion means asking some very hard 
questions; hence, the politics of distraction 
are often invoked to avoid asking them. We 
can only find a solution when we recognise 
within-schools differences as the fundamental 
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
1 Although, note the between-school variance is higher in developed countries that make the most use of  
grouping students by academic achievement at the school level: Germany is 59 and 41 per cent, and Chile  
51 and 49 per cent.
3average and the bell-shaped normal distribu-
tion of achievement), it is expected that about 
50–65 per cent of the students will be at or 
above the standard. It is highly unlikely that 
100 per cent, or even 80 per cent, of students 
will get above the standard (and, if they do, 
the claims will be that the standard was set 
too low). Thus, in any education system with 
standards that are set ‘just above the average’, 
it is highly unlikely that all students will gain the 
standard, as it is not possible for all students to 
be ‘above the average’.
Hence, the politics of standards and high 
achievement have an in-built failure system 
that results in many believing that, despite 
increased resources, the schools and teachers 
have still not delivered. It will never be the case 
that all students will exceed most achievement 
standards, and it is not the responsibility of 
schools to make all students an Albert Einstein 
or a Marie Curie. The aim of schooling should 
not be to get 100 per cent of students above 
the standard (unless the standards are set very 
low), although this is what the current politics 
demands of our schools.
THE ‘TAIL’ AND ‘NARROWING THE GAP’
It’s often said that there is a ‘tail’ of underachiev-
ing students, and that there are many more 
people than expected near the bottom of the 
achievement distribution. So millions of dollars 
are spent, even though there are few instances 
All students deserve at least a year’s progress 
for a year’s input, no matter where they start. 
But accepting this means that we stop using 
terms like achievement standards, tails, gaps 
and flatlining. We may feel comfortable using 
them, but they confuse and distract.
ACHIEVEMENT STANDARDS
We love to talk about standards, and, in 
particular, high standards. There are many 
methods of standard-setting, but, whatever 
the method, it is usually the case that they are 
set somewhat just above the average – not so 
high that too many fail and not so low that too 
many pass. Now, consider most achievement 
subjects in schools (such as English or math-
ematics). If, for any one country, you draw a 
graph of the distribution of the students, you 
get a bell-shaped curve – commonly known as 
the ‘normal curve’ (see Fig. 3.1).
When we put these two observations to-
gether (setting the standard just above the 
3. GETTING THE STRATEGY RIGHT
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Figure 3.1 A normal distribution curve.
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Indeed, there are as many Aboriginal students 
below the majority group at the upper end of 
achievement as at the lower end, but so often 
these students at the upper end are ignored 
while millions of dollars are spent trying to 
‘fix’ those at the other tail. Indeed, for many 
minority groups, paying attention to this group 
could lead to the greatest long-term benefits, 
given their potential to be leaders in their 
communities. Instead, we end up with deficit 
language about minority underachievement as 
if all minority children are below the average. 
How language can mislead and hurt!
FLATLINING
A new piece of jargon is creeping into our 
lexicon: flatlining. It is usually illustrated using 
graphs showing that the average achievement 
has not changed over past decades (despite a 
massive increase in funding, and so on). Now, 
imagine a business making a profit of $500 
million in each of the past ten years. This would 
be flatlining. But would you consider it a poor 
result? (Surely, even though the profit is not 
increasing, it’s still a great result.) In the same 
way, a flatline for schools means that each year 
a new group of students enters, and we add a 
similar amount of value to get these students 
up to last year’s ‘average’. Educators who 
achieve a consistent, high level of value add for 
each cohort of students should be lauded in 
the same way as a consistent, high-performing 
business would be.
The notion of flatlining places too much 
emphasis on rankings and not enough on 
perform ance, which can be misleading, 
particularly when the number of countries 
participating in assessments such as PISA and 
of such investment reducing the problem – it 
can’t make much difference because there will 
always be a tail.
Now, a long ‘tail’ means that countries can 
have greater spread or dispersion and that 
there are fewer students in the middle; thus 
there are flatter bell curves – there is a greater 
distance between the top group and the bot-
tom group of students. Yes, this is a problem, 
but the solution is related more to getting 
all students to improve – especially those 
just below and just above the average – and 
not being overly obsessed with those at the 
bottom, or assuming there are many more 
than expected ‘at the bottom in the tail’. (This 
is not advocating that inequality of outcomes 
should be ignored – to the contrary: a focus 
on inequality is the essence of excellent policy 
in education.)
For example, consider the distribution of Ab-
original compared to non-Aboriginal reading 
achievement in Australia (Fig. 3.2). The curves 
show the distribution of scores on the national 
assessment reading task, NAPLAN. Where is 
the tail? Where is the gap? In fact, there are 
two tails (one below the average of what 
Aboriginal students achieve, and one above 
the same average), and there are three gaps.
Lower-achieving Aboriginal students achieve 
less than non-Aboriginal students similarly 
placed on the distribution curve; Aboriginal 
students who achieve around the average for 
indigenous students achieve less than aver-
age-achieving students in the non- Aboriginal 
group; and higher-achieving Aboriginal students 
achieve less than non-Aboriginal students 
similarly placed.
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The major problem is the large spread of 
scores between the top and bottom groups 
of students, and the solution to that relates to 
getting all students to improve their achieve-
ment. All students deserve at least a year’s 
progress for a year’s input, no matter where 
they start (although those starting behind will 
need much more than a year’s progress if the 
gap is to be reduced). It is more an equity than 
an excellence problem.
TIMSS increases. Of course, both the business 
and the educators would want to increase 
and improve the ‘profit’, but flatlining is not 
necessarily a negative situation.
So we should stop talking about the tail, the 
gap and flatlining. There will always be a tail, 
there are many gaps, and, if the average is high, 
then flatlining may be a healthy trend.
Figure 3.2 NAPLAN reading results 2010, Year 3–9 students. 
Source: NAPLAN 2010, dataset sourced by author.
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A common objection to my work: it’s  
poverty that needs fixing, not schools
Before considering the list of policy prescriptions that 
distract, I want to address a common criticism of my 
work: that it leaves out the issue of poverty. As many 
have noted, students do not take a holiday from pov-
erty during school hours, and, indeed, addressing the 
impact of poverty can lead to major improvements in 
achievement. But it is a gross misreading of my work 
to say that I ignore these issues. See the chapter in 
Visible Learning (Hattie 2009) on the importance of 
home resources, for example. Poverty, homelessness, 
abuse and inappropriate use of drugs are all major 
impediments to students progressing in their learning. 
They are, in particular, killers of high expectations and 
encouragement to succeed.
It is my view that we educators cannot do much to 
fix poverty. Instead, we can offer the best chances to 
help students, no matter what their home situation is. 
Indeed, one of the reasons governments make school-
ing compulsory is that it offers all students a chance to 
succeed – and there are many teachers and schools 
that make important differences to the lives of children 
from poverty.
A belief that we can make a difference for children from 
poorly resourced families is a critical starting point, and 
the mantra needs to be, ‘I can make a profound positive 
difference to every person who crosses the school gate 
into my class or school regardless of their background.’ 
Poverty and low family resources are no excuse for not 
making a major contribution to students, although they 
certainly make for a tough start.
The two elementary schools I myself attended are clas-
sified among the lowest for socio-economic status in 
New Zealand (then and now). If fewer home resources 
were a major barrier, then I should not have grown 
up to write this paper. The difference between then 
and now is that I was never told that I was unlikely to 
succeed due to my background. Instead, my teachers 
helped me to believe that I could succeed in school. I 
am not advocating blindness to poverty and its effects; 
I am instead advocating finding success in whatever 
way possible, creating the circumstances for success 
and removing barriers (especially low expectations and 
explanations of why we cannot effectively teach these 
students) to allow the best opportunities for all.
I was blessed with some excellent teachers (thanks Mr 
Tomlinson, Mr McNeil, D. McDonald and Miss Fisher) 
and with parents who had high expectations for me. 
I was taught perseverance, deliberate practice and to 
never say no. It is surely a fundamental role of schooling 
to enable anyone to climb out of a lower socio- 
economic situation.
74. THE POLITICS OF DISTRACTION
Let’s now turn our attention to some of the 
more popular ‘fixes’ for improving student 
learning. The argument is not that any of these 
solutions is irrelevant, wrong or mischievous 
but that an overemphasis on one or all of them 
creates a distraction from other, more critical, 
more effective ways for education systems to 
become world-class.
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is well spent, we are confronting some of 
the difficulties of democracy. By allowing the 
debate to focus on what schools can do for 
us and not what we can do for schools, we 
create an argument that schools can only lose. 
We will see more national debate about the 
quality of schools, we will see more debate 
about between-school issues (rather than 
within-school variability), we will seek to find 
alternatives to government- funded schools, 
and we will see more and more people 
viewing non-government schooling as better. 
The government-funded school system will 
be for those parents ‘not willing’ to invest in 
their own children’s education; there will be 
more public–private initiatives, and there will 
be even greater misunderstanding about how 
schools can actually be successful.
Choice
This misunderstanding will start (in many coun-
tries it has already started) with middle-class 
flight from government-funded schools. The 
OECD average is 82 per cent of students 
attending government-funded schools, and in 
many countries this percentage is dropping 
(OECD 2014: 409). Many have argued that 
the presence of a strong, government-funded 
school system is key to the survival of democ-
racy and that there must be a critical mass in 
the public system to ensure effective advocacy 
for this democracy. But many parents see the 
grass as greener in the private system. The 
‘private’ brand is compelling, and parents pay 
high fees for these schools in the hopes of 
insuring a high quality education for their child. 
There is the perception of there being slightly 
higher odds of a good education (or at least 
of meeting the ‘right’ people and avoiding the 
‘wrong’ ones).
DISTRACTION 1: APPEASE THE PARENTS
Perhaps the greatest explanation for why sys-
tems look to policies that make little difference 
to student learning is that they are aimed at 
appeasing parents. Parents have power as they, 
not the students, are the voters.
The Californian system is an example of ap-
peasement. A generation ago, California was 
one of the leading education states in the 
USA. Despite recent signs of improvement, 
that is not the case now (with low graduation 
rates, flight from public schools, etc.). By giving 
voters powers over specific propositions (such 
as levels of tax that then supports schools, 
teacher salaries and resources), some of the 
most regressive policies in the USA have been 
enacted, severely harming the quality and 
future of the state school system.
California has newly built schools that cannot 
be opened due to financial restrictions, while 
overcrowded, falling-down schools next door 
keep going. Negative policies have been sub-
sequently introduced to put Band Aids on an 
almost hopeless system, and all this has led 
to a vicious spiral of falling public confidence 
in teachers, leaders and public schools – not 
thanks to any fault of the personnel but 
because the power given to the people has, 
until recently, blocked tax monies going into 
education. This issue will only get worse as 
the proportion of voters without children in 
public schooling grows.
California illustrates what we are about to 
confront globally. As attention moves from 
how to best educate students to how to 
best convince voters that their tax money 
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lower SES schools are less effective than those 
in higher SES schools in adding value (indeed, 
in Australia, the growth effects for students 
are higher in below-average SES schools than 
in above-average SES schools) (OECD 2014: 
409). Further, socio-economic background is 
very much a correlate of prior achievement, 
leading to false assumptions about the quality 
of lower SES schools. In some ways, a fair 
proportion of the correlation between socio- 
economic status and outcomes is the correla-
tion between prior and post performance.
Reduce class sizes
Reducing class sizes is an innovation that cer-
tainly appeases parents, teachers and school 
leaders. Parents see reducing class size as a 
proxy for more attention being paid to their 
children. School leaders see it as a proxy for 
more resources (since salaries are 80+ per 
cent of most budgets, more staff automatically 
means more money), and teachers argue it is 
less stressful and more effective to deal with 
fewer students.
The evidence from the many meta-analyses on 
reducing class size shows a positive but small 
effect. Thus, the major question needs to be, 
‘Why is this effect so small?’ The answer seems 
to be that teachers rarely change how they 
teach when they move from larger to smaller 
classes. (For example, they continue to talk 
as much, if not more, than they did in larger 
classes; see Hattie 2005.)
Maybe if they changed how they teach to 
make the most of having fewer students, the 
effect would be larger. But they do not. To 
paraphrase Andreas Schleicher, ‘If you have to 
choose between great teaching and a small 
When students’ prior achievement or socio- 
economic background is considered, however, 
the evidence shows little difference in achieve-
ment between private and public schools in 
many systems (OECD 2014: 409). Of course, 
private schools promote the brand that they 
have better teachers, smaller class sizes, better 
equipment, more extra-curricular activities 
– and this is a very successful script for the 
politics of distraction because private schools 
can rarely show they have better outcomes 
(especially when prior incoming achievement 
is taken into account). It’s fascinating that often 
the same people who think public schools 
are wasting money are happy to spend lots 
of money on private schools for their own 
children.
In the spirit of appeasing parents, systems 
promote the language of choice, although it is 
usually only the more affluent who can exercise 
any choice offered. The choice is nearly always 
a choice of schools (not teachers), and the 
typical choice is between government-funded 
and private schools. As noted above, this choice 
between schools is despite between-school 
variability being, in most Western countries, 
small relative to the much more important 
‘within-school variability’. This raises the ques-
tion, ‘Why do we provide choice at the school 
level when this matters far less than the choice 
of teacher within a school?’
The vicious aspect of the ‘choice’ debate is that 
too many parents make their decisions based 
on proxies of school success. The worst proxy 
is using socio-economic status (SES) as if it is 
some indicator of quality. While the average 
levels of achievement can be lower in low SES 
schools, there is no evidence that teachers in 
WHAT DOESN’T WORK IN EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF DISTRACTION
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class, go for the great teaching’ (Schleicher 
2015).
Figure 4.1 shows the average country PISA 
score (an average of each country’s reading, 
numeracy and science scores) according to 
aver age class size. There is little obvious rela-
tion. Note, this is not suggesting that systems 
should increase class size (across studies, I 
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 Source: OECD, 2014b (average PISA scores), OECD, 2013 (class size).  
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I thank Dan Murphy for noting errors to this figure in the first printing of the report.
have found that the overall effect of smaller 
class sizes is a positive, not negative, .20), but if 
the evidence is to be ignored (as it often is on 
this topic), then reduction needs to be aligned 
with specific, evidence-based proposals for 
investment in teacher expertise to teach 
differently – and more effectively – in smaller 
classes.
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DISTRACTION 2:  
FIX THE INFRASTRUCTURE
One of the major distractions to truly making 
a difference is the quest for better infrastruc-
ture: if only we had more effective curricula, 
more rigorous standards, more tests and 
more alternative-shaped buildings … or so 
the argument goes. So let’s look at some of 
these infrastructure ideas.
Tinker with the curriculum
At the centre of any curriculum are the ex-
pectations of what is to be learned at various 
milestones. Setting these expectations is the 
power of curriculum (provided the expect-
ations are constructively aligned to the assess-
ments and resources used in classrooms). Too 
often, however, curriculum expectations are 
stipulated in ‘years’, as if all students in a year 
cohort are working at the same level. A better 
interpretation of the ‘5’ in ‘Year 5’ is that there 
is likely to be five years’ spread of performance 
in that year (students working at Year 1–5 
levels of achievement); in Year 10 there is likely 
to be ten years’ spread of performance, and so 
on. But even with our almost-universal year-
based system of schooling, it is still possible 
to ameliorate the worst damages of grouping 
children as if they were all working at the 
same achievement levels. We can do this by 
implementing a levels-based curriculum with 
levels-based assessments (where students 
work at their level irrespective of their year 
in school or age) rather than a year-based 
curriculum.
Countries that have levels-based curricula are 
more likely to be attuned to student develop-
ment and more likely to seek progress for all. 
Levels-based curricula with clear milestones, 
targets or expectations, which are then aligned 
with the assessment system, are more likely 
to have an impact on student learning than 
year-based curricula.
There is surprisingly little research on how stu-
dents develop and progress through various 
subjects, but we know they grow at different 
rates, depending on their prior accomplish-
ments. Too many curricula are crowded, not 
aligned with the assessment systems, have low 
or poorly articulated expectations of progress 
and assume all students progress in similar 
ways. We need more sophisticated diagnostic 
tools to help teachers ascertain each student’s 
recent successes and work out the best way 
for them to progress to the next level. A one-
size-fits-all approach does not work.
Emphasise either surface or deep learning
There are those who say the route forward 
is more facts, or knowledge-based learning. 
There are those who favour deep learning, or 
twenty-first-century skills. This is a false dichot-
omy, even if it is one that has been common 
for aeons. In the fifth century bc, Socrates 
promoted a method of questioning that led 
students to reconsider their confused mean-
ing, inadequate evidence, self-contradictory 
beliefs and woolly thinking. He encouraged 
them to seek evidence, examine reasoning 
and assumptions, analyse basic concepts and 
see the implications of critical thinking. Socrat-
ic questioning is now a commonplace notion 
(although unfortunately not so common in 
classrooms). Then followed the Greek Scep-
tics and, later, Thomas Aquinas, who claimed 
we needed to develop critical thought and 
reasoning to be systematically cultivated. The 
If only we had more effective 
curricula, more rigorous 
standards, more tests and more 
alternative-shaped buildings
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Renaissance led to searching for analysis and 
critique, and so on . . .
On the other hand, in the mid nineteenth cen-
tury, when state-funded schools were being 
developed to educate compliant workers for 
lower-level jobs, this emphasis on thinking was 
reversed to privilege facts. Mr Gradgrind, the 
headmaster in Dickens’s Hard Times, preferred 
his students to be brimful of facts, and upon 
demanding the definition of a horse from a 
pupil received the reply, ‘It is a Quadruped. 
Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty- 
four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve 
incisors. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy 
countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but 
requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by 
marks in mouth’ (1854: 7).
The use of curricula full of things to know, the 
push to know the ‘great books’, the back-to-
the-basics movement and many other develop-
ments, have privileged the facts. The common 
assessment methods do the same, and, despite 
the expertise of their writers, many students 
approach multiple-choice tests with the belief 
that what is needed is evidence of their know-
ledge of facts and the skill to recognise the right 
answers. Finding out what teachers want you 
to know and giving it back to them in assign-
ments and exams is a common key to success 
(and many teachers expect this to occur). 
Such narrow excellence tends not to favour 
twenty- first-century deeper-thinking skills such 
as creativity, critical thinking, communication and 
collaboration.
The art of teaching is to balance the need 
for surface knowledge with deep processing 
of this knowledge. Deeper-thinking skills need 
content on which to work. You cannot use 
deeper-thinking skills unless you have some-
thing to think about. The more effective tax-
onomies of thinking highlight this relationship. 
Consider the SOLO taxonomy (Biggs and 
Tang 2011), for example (see Fig. 4.2).
enumerate describe
list combine
do algorithms
compare/contrast
explain causes
analyse
relate
apply
theorize
generalize
hypothesize
reflect
identify
do simple
procedure
misses point
Prestructural
Quantitative phase Quantitative phase
Unistructural Multistructural Relational Extended abstract
Figure 4.2 The SOLO taxonomy. 
 Source: Biggs and Tang (2011). Reproduced with the kind permission of Open  
University Press. All rights reserved.
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Surface and deep learning: two interesting 
developments
There are two interesting developments due to take 
place over the next few years. First, the Chinese govern-
ment’s most recent policy on education (the Outline 
of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term 
Education Reform and Development) states that
reducing the schoolwork burdens on students is 
the society’s shared responsibility. . . . The ways 
and means to test and evaluate student perfor-
mance and to appraise school operation shall 
be reformed. . . . Schools should reduce students’ 
schoolwork burdens so as to give students enough 
time to learn about the society, think deeply, 
practice more, and do exercises and amuse 
themselves. It is imperative to improve teachers’ 
professional quality, their teaching methods and 
efficiency, while cutting down on homework and 
classroom examinations. 
(UNESCO 2010: 15)
Second, the next subject to be added to the PISA 
tests (currently on reading, numeracy and science) is 
collaborative problem-solving (Griffin et al. 2012).1 This 
will involve students solving a set of problems with 
another person or a computer-simulated person. The 
chat between the two is scored for each student to 
assess their levels of collaboration.
1 Pearson, the publisher of this paper, have developed the conceptual framework of the collaborative problem -
solving assessments for PISA (2015) and (2018).
This taxonomy has a five-level hierarchy: no 
knowledge, one idea, many ideas, relating ideas 
and extending ideas. The one and many ideas 
are surface thinking, and the latter two are 
deeper thinking, but the latter depend on the 
former. The important questions are:
• Do the students have the surface under-
standings to then apply the deep thinking?
• What is the proportion of surface to deep 
thinking in this lesson? and
• When is it the right time to move from 
gathering ideas to relating and extending 
them?
When you are learning something new, you 
need a greater proportion of surface to deep 
thinking, but as you become more proficient, 
the balance can change to more deep thinking. 
Consider, for example, the following seemingly 
sane and sensible teaching programmes privi-
leging deep learning:
• inquiry-based learning;
• individualised instruction;
• matching teaching to styles of thinking;
• problem-based learning;
• whole-language learning; and
• student control over learning.
The average effect-sizes of these programmes 
are very low (0.31, 0.22, 0.17, 0.15, 0.06 and 
0.04 respectively), well below the average 
of many possible influences of 0.4. It is not 
that they are not worthwhile programmes. 
The problem is that too often they are im-
plemented in a way that does not develop 
surface understanding first.
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The solution is less about twenty-first-century 
or inquiry learning and more about knowing 
when to think surface and when to think deep. 
It is about the appropriate proportions of 
surface and deep in any series of lessons and 
about knowing when to move from learning 
more ideas to relating and extending these 
ideas. When we learn new material, we might 
need a higher focus on surface, but as we be-
come more proficient, the balance should shift 
to the deeper. Astonishingly, when lesson plans 
are analysed to see whether students delve 
deeper than the facts, about 80 per cent are 
devised so that this deeper learning does not 
occur (Fullan and Langworthy 2014).
More achievement tests; or, testing gone 
mad
Typically, a call for a ‘more rigorous curriculum’ 
is coupled with ‘more tests’ to check the cur-
riculum has been implemented and that teach-
ers are doing their job. I recall working in one 
US state that prescribed a set of curriculum 
objectives for each half of the year and a test 
that related to each half. Halfway through the 
year, the teachers stopped teaching the first 
half of the curriculum and moved to the sec-
ond half and started to prepare the students 
for the next test, regardless of whether or not 
students had understood the first half. These 
teachers were doing the job asked of them, 
but how absurd that the system assumed the 
curriculum was this ‘packagable’. The pressure 
to cover the second half of the curriculum for 
the next test meant teachers could not return 
to address what students did not understand 
in the first half. This is testing gone mad!
There are millions of achievement tests, and 
multi-millions of test items, but there is little 
evidence that creating more achievement tests 
will help much. Even if the tests become more 
available online, more responsive, adaptive 
and efficient (and prettier) for as long as they 
are focused on providing information about 
student achievement, they will continue to tell 
us little.
I am not arguing against assessments in schools. 
The major purpose of assessment in schools, 
however, should be to provide interpretative 
information to teachers and school leaders 
about their impact so that they have the best 
information possible about where to go next 
in the teaching process.
Instead, we drop tests on schools like ‘preci-
sion bombs’. We see the purpose of testing 
as informing the student, not the teacher, how 
to change and adapt, and we create tests, 
not reports, first. Until we see tests as aids 
to enhance teaching and learning and not 
primarily as thermometers of how much a 
student knows now, on this day, on this test, 
then developing more tests will add little and 
will remain an expensive distraction.
Change the buildings and open spaces
Governments love infrastructure – and es-
pecially love to build new buildings: they can 
see the effects of their largesse; they can open 
them with fanfare; and the buildings can be 
named after someone important (and maybe 
after the person who funded the largesse). 
New buildings are particularly promoted 
when they are different: lots of glass, no walls 
or doors, for example.
Yet there are so many studies and meta- 
analyses that show that changing the shape of 
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buildings does not lead to teachers teaching 
differently. For example, in open spaces, teach-
ers are adept at using bookcases, trees in pots 
and posters to recreate their own ‘walled-in’ 
spaces. This does not mean that open spaces 
cannot lead to better teaching – indeed they 
can, and there are many instances of superb 
teaching in open spaces.
Too often, however, many of these newer con-
figurations are missed opportunities because 
there has been no prior investment in work-
ing with teachers to show them how they 
can teach differently and effectively in these 
spaces. I have long argued that there should 
be manuals of advice (How to Teach in Open 
Spaces for Dummies, for example) so that each 
school does not first welcome the space and 
then decide what to do with it.
Teachers should be coached in alternative 
ways of teaching that open space invites, 
should be coached in working with each other 
to teach together in these spaces and should 
be coached on how to evaluate their impact 
when working in these different spaces.
Distraction #3: 
FIX THE STUDENTS
If only we had better, 
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language, seriation and so on – that are pre-
cursors to later reading and numeracy.
We also need better evaluation of the effects of 
different early years’ programmes on learning, 
and we need to have more effective longitudinal 
studies of learning from the ages of 0–8 onwards. 
This research can be done: the Abecedarian 
programme includes 100-plus play-based learn-
ing games for 0–3-year-olds, and the positive 
effects of these early learning experiences can 
be traced in a cohort of students (compared 
to others not in the programme) twenty years 
later (Sparling et al. 2007).
Using labelling to explain
When students fail to thrive in the early 
school years, there is an increasing move to 
‘label’ these students. Indeed, there has been a 
major increase in the number of children who 
come to school each day pre-labelled. In my 
own state, Victoria, the incidence of autism and 
Asperger’s has increased 340 per cent in the 
past three years; in the USA, autism increased 
650 per cent in the past ten years. Many sys-
tems now have 15 per cent or more of their 
students pre-labelled and drugged in some 
way compared to 3–8 per cent pre-2000 
(Seltzer et al. 2011).
Although diagnostic tests may have improved, 
it is hard to believe that these major increases 
in incidence are real. One potential reason for 
the increase might be parents’ (and teachers’) 
desire to seek an explanation for ‘unusual’ be-
haviours and the medical and pharmaceutical 
professions’ ready provision of answers (and 
drugs). Another potential reason for the spike 
might be the extra funding that is tied to stu-
dents who are labelled as autistic.
DISTRACTION 3: FIX THE STUDENTS
Pour more money into early childhood 
education
During a child’s first five years, there is re-
markable brain development. They can learn 
so much, and there are so many opportunities 
to enhance their learning. Thus, there has been 
a focus in many systems on providing early 
childhood education systems. Many countries 
are investing so much in these early years that 
we should be marvelling at children’s increased 
readiness to learn reading and number skills 
when they start school. Alas, there are meta- 
analyses that show that by the age of eight it 
is hard to detect who did and did not have 
pre-school education (Nelson et al. 2003).
But the role of the early years is for play-
based learning, according to the counter- 
argument. Yes, play may well be critical, but 
recent reviews raise questions about the 
adequacy of evidence to support some as-
pects of play. For example, Lillard et al. (2013: 
27) concluded that ‘despite over 40 years of 
research examining how pretend play might 
help development, there is little evidence that 
it has a crucial role’. Perhaps this is because 
pre-schools emphasise play for social and 
emotional development at the expense of 
play for cognitive development.
Before pouring in more money, we need a 
robust discussion about what learning means 
in the 0–5 age range – and especially at 0–3 
when the most critical bases are set for lan-
guage, communication, listening and thinking. 
I do not mean discussion about reading and 
times tables but about the many cognitive 
skills that develop in these early years: rhyme, 
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the previous year. This is one of the few areas 
in education where it is difficult to find studies 
that show a positive effect on achievement. 
The research shows that being retained one 
year almost doubles a student’s likelihood of 
dropping out, while being held back twice 
almost guarantees it (Hattie 2009). Add to this 
the equity issue: consider two students of the 
same achievement (in the USA), and it is four 
times more likely that the student of colour 
(African American, Hispanic) will be retained 
and the other (White) student of the same 
achievement level will be promoted. The only 
question of interest relating to retention is why 
it persists in the face of this damning evidence 
(and it is a very expensive intervention).
So why does it still occur? More than any other 
group, it is the teachers who ask for it on the 
basis of ‘If I only had him for another year, I 
could make a difference.’ (Note that 80 per 
cent of retained students are male.) But you 
had him for a year, and you failed! What this 
student does not need is more of the same 
kind of teaching, more of the same kind of ac-
tivities, more of the same kind of assessment, 
more of the same kind of peer interactions. 
What this student needs is different teaching, 
different activities, different assessments and 
different peer interactions. At the moment, 
this means social promotion; that is, promoting 
them by their age group.
Teach to the learning styles
‘But my son/daughter/student learns differ-
ently from others’: this concept has led to a 
proliferation of various learning styles, the 
most common being that students have a 
preference for learning in an auditory, visual, 
tactile or kinaesthetic (with their hands) style 
This is not to insinuate that ADHD and autism 
are not real; they are. Instead, I believe that 
the massive increase in the frequency of these 
labels points to a potential cultural problem: 
students are being diagnosed and labelled pri-
marily for financial and accountability reasons 
rather than for the enactment of appropriate 
educational interventions.
In the medicine and psychology professions, 
diagnoses are the starting point for interven-
tions, but in education, diagnoses seem to lead 
to explanations for why we cannot intervene. 
The logic seems to be that if students with 
behaviour issues are ‘calmed’, they will learn. 
What is often missed is that while individual 
interventions and drugs may calm these chil-
dren there is no necessary corollary that they 
will then learn. In fact, there are learning inter-
ventions that have been shown to be more 
effective in educating students with behaviour 
issues than medication. In my own work I have 
found that if you take two students with the 
same personality and behaviour problems, and 
label only one (with, say, autism, Asperger’s or 
ADHD), you will observe a major decrease 
in achievement gains for the labelled student 
compared to similar non-labelled student 
(Hattie 2009). However, a learning interven-
tion is much more expensive for the system 
(and requires high levels of teacher expertise) 
than drugs or medical attention, which the 
parents pay for.
Hold the students back
A commonly recommended solution for stu-
dents who are not achieving is to hold them 
back a year. It seems obvious: if you cannot 
meet the standards for entering the next 
grade level, it is better to hold back and repeat 
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and learn best when instruction is oriented to 
that style. There is little evidence that the many 
measures of learning styles have led to similar 
classification of students; thus, the robustness 
of classifying students is questionable.
Further, there is little evidence that when 
teaching is matched to style there is enhanced 
learning. Yes, teachers should use various 
methods of teaching, and if one method does 
not work they should change to another, but 
there is no support for classifying students by 
learning style and then matching the teaching 
to that style.
If only schools had 
more money 
and autonomy, 
they would be 
better schools
Distraction #4: 
FIX THE SCHOOLS
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leadership, a transformational principal would 
set the vision, establish the school goals, define 
the expectations, provide support for teachers, 
buffer the staff from external demands, ensure 
that staffing is fair and equitable and promote a 
high degree of autonomy for the staff. However, 
the effect of such transformational leaders in 
schools is very low, whereas that of instructional 
leaders is much higher (Robinson et al. 2008).
Schools need high-impact instructional leaders, 
ones who make several formal classroom ob-
servations each year, interpret test scores with 
teachers, insist teachers collaborate in planning 
and evaluating the teaching programme across 
grades, insist teachers expect high proportions 
of their students to do well on achievement 
and social outcomes and insist and know that 
the staffroom and classroom atmosphere is 
conducive to learning for all students.
There is an urgent need for leadership litera-
ture that says more about educational matters 
and the role of leaders in putting in place 
high-impact practice, building collaborative 
expertise and seeking and privileging success-
ful teaching that leads to maximum student 
growth and understanding.
All that is needed is autonomy
Another great distraction is the debate about 
school autonomy. It is promised by govern-
ments to improve the quality of schooling, 
with the claim that decision-making is best 
done locally (even as many take autonomy 
from schools and give it back in bits and 
pieces) and is often coupled with many other 
so-called desirable attributes such as choice, 
competition and accountability.
DISTRACTION 4: FIX THE SCHOOLS
Create new forms of schools
It is ironic that a popular solution to claims 
about ‘failing schools’ is to invent new forms of 
schools. There is a remarkable hunger to create 
charter schools, for-profit schools, lighthouse 
schools, free schools, academies, public–pri-
vate schools – anything other than a public 
school. But, given that the variance in student 
achievement between schools is small relative 
to variance within schools, it is folly to believe 
that a solution lies in different forms of schools.
These new forms of schools usually start with 
fanfare, with self-selected staff (and sometimes 
selected students) and are sought by parents 
who want ‘something better’. Indeed, there is 
evidence there is a slight increase in achieve-
ment in these schools in the short term, but 
the long-term effects lead to no differences 
when compared with public schools. The 
effect of charter schools, for example, across 
three meta-analyses based on 246 studies is a 
minuscule .07 (Hattie 2009).
This lack of a marked effect is surely not sur-
prising when it is realised that within a year or 
so the ‘different’ school becomes just another 
school, with all the usual issues that confront 
all schools.
Privilege hero and transformational leaders
Another common ‘fix’ is to look to the busi-
ness world for ideas for improving schools, 
particularly for leadership. After all, there are 
plenty of remarkable business leaders. Yet one 
of the greatest distractions is to borrow the 
notion of the transformational leader from the 
business community. In the context of school 
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teachers and choosing textbooks and 
instructional methods.
• Local autonomy is more effective when 
school leaders are instructional leaders 
rather than transformational leaders.
So, autonomy about some factors in schooling 
can have a positive effect (although the effects 
on achievement are still small). Relative to 
other impacts on student learning, school au-
tonomy is not the place to invest lots of effort. 
Perhaps it should be continued if the increased 
autonomy leads to increased student learning: 
‘use it or lose it’ may be more compelling than 
autonomy or not!
But the debate about school autonomy misses 
two major issues. First, the greater the amount 
of local autonomy, the more likely it is that 
schools become unequal: the better schools 
tend to become better, and the not-so-good 
schools tend to become worse.
Second, granting autonomy to schools and 
principals distracts from the real issue: to what 
level should individual teachers have auton-
omy over how they teach? As Larry Cuban 
(2013) has argued, in many other professions, 
the front people (e.g., doctors, engineers) have 
lost much of their autonomy over the past fifty 
years because their decisions now are very 
much based on research evidence. The days 
when GPs made their own interpretations of 
treatment without recourse to evidence-based 
research are thankfully well past. But this situ-
ation is not even close in teaching. We need 
to ask, ‘Under what conditions and to what 
extent should teachers have autonomy?’
There is a belief that by creating choice and 
competition and then locating responsibility at 
the local school level there will be incentives 
to improve the quality and accountability of 
each school. The argument is that schools, like 
businesses, should thrive (or not) based on 
their proficiency to meet or create consumer 
demands.
The road to autonomy is well travelled. There 
are many countries where decisions related to 
resource allocation and curriculum and assess-
ment are local and principals have high levels 
of autonomy (the Czech Republic, the Nether-
lands and Macao, for example). There are other 
countries where local decision-making relates 
only to resource allocation and not to curricu-
lum and assessment (Chile, Hungary, Sweden, 
Bulgaria, Dubai and Shanghai). And there are 
countries where local decision-making is high 
relating to curriculum and assessment (Japan, 
South Korea, New Zealand, Hong Kong, China 
and Thailand). The key issue in any discussion 
about autonomy needs to be about what is 
controlled, where and with what responsibil-
ities for maximising impact. My reading of the 
evidence shows the following:
• Achievement is higher in countries where 
schools have autonomy in staffing deci-
sions, in hiring teachers and where there 
are high levels of external accountability 
(such as inspections and external exit 
examinations) but negative when schools 
have autonomy over formulating their 
own budget.
• Achievement is higher when school prin-
cipals have some control over opportun-
istic learning costs such as the purchase of 
instructional supplies, hiring and rewarding 
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It is a common plea for more money to be 
added into the education system, but there 
is less of a plea to account for the efficiency 
or effectiveness of how the money is to be 
spent to improve education outcomes. The 
programme logic stops at some point in the 
causal chain: add more money to get more 
teachers, lower class sizes and more teacher 
aide support, but where is the evidence that 
all these extra resources lead to improved 
learning? The ‘extra’ stops with the adults, as if 
then the effects on students are obvious.
Except they are not. It is not the amount of 
money spent that is important but how it is 
spent and how the programme logic of in-
vesting more then leads to enhanced student 
outcomes not enhanced adult satisfaction. As 
Andreas Schleicher has shown (2012), if we 
invest in more untrained adults, lower class 
sizes and many other structural features, the 
costs will go up appreciably with no significant 
effect on student achievement. The question 
‘How to spend money effectively?’ should be 
the key issue.
Further, there are few financial incentives for a 
teacher to maximise student achievement as 
most of these financial incentives are related 
more directly to school than to teacher differ-
ences. Policy-makers should not expect to gain 
increases in overall levels of student achieve-
ment simply by adjusting annual funding rates, 
although it is a common claim that results 
will follow from delivering more funding to 
schools. If an increase in student achievement 
is desired, policy-makers should consider alter-
native funding models with stronger links to 
the variables that do affect student outcomes.
Invest more money
Perhaps the answer is more obvious: provide 
more money to the schools for them to do 
their job. Of course money matters. Jonathan 
Kozol (2005: 59) believes it is, citing Deborah 
Meier’s comment to support his view: ‘I’ll 
believe money doesn’t count the day the rich 
stop spending so much money on their own 
children.’ Even so, in most Western countries 
it is hard to find evidence that more money 
makes much of a difference: above a certain 
level of funding, there is little relation between 
more money and improved achievement.
This should not be surprising, as 80 per cent 
of funding is fixed in salaries, buildings, bussing 
and maintenance; the discretionary amounts 
are relatively small, and where these amounts 
are spent on instructional matters (such 
as resources for teachers), there is a small 
positive impact. But these expenditures are 
small in their effect on students compared to 
the effects of resources invested in teacher 
expert ise (Grubb 2009).
There does appear to be a tipping point 
between the cumulative expenditure on ed-
ucation from ages six to sixteen and average 
reading scores (see Fig. 4.3). For low-income 
countries, expenditure is a good predictor of 
mean performance. However, for countries 
with middle to high GDPs, there is no relation-
ship between expenditure and performance. 
A 2012 OECD report on money and achieve-
ment concluded that ‘Money alone can’t buy a 
good education system. … Among wealthier 
economies; those that prioritise the quality of 
teachers over smaller classes tend to show 
better performance. When it comes to money 
and education, the question isn’t how much? 
but rather for what?’ (OECD 2012: 4).
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Lengthen the school day or year
Another popular, and expensive, education fix 
is to lengthen the school day or school year. 
Figure 4.4 shows average PISA 2012 achieve-
ment scores arrayed by the average number 
of intended instructional hours per year for 
the thirty-three mainly developed nations for 
which we have both sets of data.
A correlational analysis of the hours of instruc-
tional time and student achievement reveals a 
negative relationship on average (−0.32) and 
for each subject (reading −0.25, math −0.35, 
and science −0.33). Even once you remove 
the three lowest scoring countries, the rela-
tionship only approaches zero, making it clear 
that merely adding more time to the day, or 
days to the year, makes little difference.
Figure 4.3 Average reading performance in PISA and average spending per student from the age of six 
to fifteen. 
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FIX THE TEACHERS
If only teachers had better 
initial training, were paid 
for performance and 
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programmes on student learning. The studies 
that are available show teacher-education pro-
grammes have among the lowest overall impact 
of all the influences on student achievement. I 
found three meta-analyses (Hattie 2009) with 
a very low effect size of 0.11 – ranked 124 of 
150 influences on student achievement.
When we look at the development of teacher 
expertise, the greatest learning is not from 
teacher-education programmes but from the 
first year of full-time classroom teaching (the 
next is from the second year). After this, the 
increase in the development of expertise fades 
and initial teacher education has little or no ef-
fect. There is a well-known phenomenon called 
‘transition shock’ which is what new teachers 
discover when they are ‘released’ into their first 
year in the classroom. The class is buzzing, busy 
and decision-laden, and most new teachers say 
they were not well prepared for the harsh real-
ity of the classroom. ‘Lack of preparation shock’ 
would probably be a better label.
These findings about teacher education have 
many critical implications, first among them 
that teacher education should focus on teach-
ers being excellent in the first few years of 
classroom teaching. Teacher education needs 
to be about preparing students for the imme-
diate practice of teaching. The recent push to-
wards clinical models of teaching is promising, 
provided that the true essence of such clinical 
teaching is to provide new teachers with the 
skills of how to ‘Diagnose’, how to have mul-
tiple ‘Implementations’ and how to ‘Evaluate’ 
their effectiveness – a framework of skills my 
colleagues and I have dubbed, ‘Teaching is to 
DIE for’ (see Hattie et al. 2014). 
DISTRACTION 5: FIX THE TEACHERS
Certainly there is a constant clamour to em-
phasise the teacher is the key, with claims that 
the system is only as good as the teacher and 
that teacher standards must be raised. In many 
ways this is correct, except that teachers can-
not do it on their own: they need support, they 
need to collaborate with others in and across 
schools, they need to develop expertise, and 
they need excellent school leaders. Further, 
supportive and great systems are needed to 
support and nurture great leaders. But more 
often the debate is about improving teacher 
education, introducing performance pay and 
other such distractions.
Changing initial teacher education
Improving initial teacher education has long 
been debated as a ‘fix’ for raising teacher 
standards. In Australia, for example, there has 
been, on average, at least one major state or 
national enquiry per year into teacher educa-
tion over the past thirty years.
Each enquiry arrives at much the same conclu-
sions on the deficiencies of teacher education 
and makes some general suggestions for im-
provement – particularly what is to be taught 
in these programmes. The recommendations 
are usually about how much time should be 
spent teaching particular subjects, demanding 
more time practising in schools, imploring 
building closer school–tertiary collaborations 
and insisting on higher entry or exit standards.
At present, teacher education is little more 
than a cottage industry, an apprenticeship 
rather than a profession, and it is devoid of 
debate about the effect of teacher education 
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But neither is the status quo acceptable: 
nearly all teachers receive a satisfactory rating 
through performance appraisals, and even 
beginning teachers believe they deserve the 
highest performance ratings. More than 90 
per cent of teachers say they would receive 
no recognition if they improved the quality of 
their teaching or were more innovative in the 
classroom (Jensen 2012).
Perhaps the solution is to change direction and 
introduce better pay for increased expertise 
rather than for performance. That is, when 
teachers attain additional expertise (such as 
studying to become a learning-difficulties coach, 
assessment coach or literacy coach) and take 
responsibility for improving the skills of their fel-
low teachers within a school, they could receive 
additional payment. This model would mean that 
teachers do not have to leave the classroom 
to be paid higher salaries; their expertise can 
be recognised, developed and esteemed; and 
they would be improving their expertise and 
their colleague’s expertise, provided that they 
can demonstrate that their additional expertise 
actually enhances the progress of students.
Technology as a magic bullet
Another distraction is the demand for teachers 
to adopt new technologies. We have been 
hearing that ‘the technology revolution is 
coming’ for the past thirty years or more and 
how the advent of desktop computers, iPads, 
smartphones, the Cloud and so on will radically 
change classrooms. We are told that WiFi is fast, 
available, cheap and will transform education; 
that there are terabytes of information available 
and that schools need access to the web to find 
it; that kids are now digital natives, wired and 
on social media and that classrooms need to 
Any evidence of transition shock among teach-
ers in their first year could well be considered 
evidence of the failure of the teacher-education 
programme to prepare its students for teaching. 
We may need to consider a two-year ‘registrar’ 
position as the key part of pre-service teacher 
education, in the same way that the first two 
registrar years in medicine are considered part 
of their ‘pre-service’ clinical training. The focus 
in these years should be on supporting these 
teachers to make an excellent transition into 
fully fledged members of the profession.
There is a simple conclusion: we need to 
dramatically improve teacher-education 
programmes. The most obvious place to 
begin is by asking for evidence of how these 
programmes impact on the capabilities of 
teacher candidates to enhance their students’ 
learning. Stop asking about the features of the 
programmes and start asking institutions to 
provide evidence of their impact.
Performance pay
Another suggestion for ‘fixing the teachers’ 
is to pay more based on their performance. 
It is intuitively obvious that if teachers are 
offered such an incentive, this will drive them 
to improve their impact on students. Despite 
the many implementations of performance 
pay, it is difficult to find a performance-pay 
model that has made much, if any, difference 
to student learning. If anything, the effects can 
be the opposite to those desired: teachers in 
performance-pay systems tend to work fewer 
hours per week and are involved in fewer un-
paid cooperative activities. Their stress levels 
increase, and their enthusiasm decreases.
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Peter Blatchford, from the Institute of Edu-
cation at the University of London, has com-
pleted a systematic study of teaching aides 
(Blatchford et al. 2012). He noted that they 
have tripled in the past ten years: one in four 
staff members in the English school work-
force are teacher aides, and they account for 
16 per cent of the gross school expenditure. 
Teachers love them and claim they reduce 
their stress and increase job satisfaction, re-
duce workloads, improve student outcomes 
and allow them to improve the quality of 
their teaching. Blatchford, however, could find 
no effect on students’ confidence, motivation, 
attention, independence, relationships with 
peers, work-completion rates or in following 
instructions.
Those students receiving the most support 
from teacher aides made less progress than 
similar pupils who received little or no support 
from teacher aides, even after controlling for 
factors likely to be related to more teacher- 
aide support (e.g., prior attainment and 
special-education status). Teacher aides work 
more often with the students that most need 
expertise, and the more support they provide 
the lower the progress.
The reasons for these null-to-negative findings 
is that teacher aides tend to separate the 
teacher from the students (particularly those 
students most in need of teacher expertise); 
they become an alternative rather than an 
addition to the teacher; the students they sup-
port spend less time covering the mainstream 
curriculum; teacher-aide explanations are 
sometimes inaccurate or confusing; teacher 
aides are more likely to prompt pupils and 
provide them with answers; and they are most 
concerned with task completion.
run to catch up. So why has a transformation in 
teaching not yet occurred?
Larry Cuban (2003) asked this ‘why not’ 
question and concluded that technologies will 
never be used in any transformative sense until 
we change our teaching methods. At best we 
will use technology to consume more facts 
and knowledge, and we will use the Internet 
instead of the encyclopedia, PowerPoint and 
Word instead of slate and paper, and complete 
practice tasks online instead of on worksheets. 
As before technology, we prioritise knowledge 
consumption.
Once again, the grammar of schooling privi-
leges ‘knowing much’ rather than encouraging 
faster, more efficient and socially wired 
connections. It will only be when we move 
from using technology as a newer form of 
knowledge consumption to seeing technology 
as an aid to teaching for enhanced knowledge 
production that there will be an effect.
Have more adults in schools
It was noted earlier that reducing class size is 
a common distraction. A related distraction 
is to ask for more adults in schools to assist 
teachers. In the USA, since 1970, the K-12 stu-
dent population has increased by 10 per cent, 
but the number of full-time school employees 
has grown by 95 percent (NCES 2013) (see 
Fig.4.5). Indeed, if you look back a little further 
to 1950, you will find that the number of adults 
in schools has grown 386 per cent – teachers 
by 252 per cent and administrators and other 
staff by 702 per cent (Scafidi 2012). It seems 
we believe that we can solve our school 
dilemmas by putting more and more adults 
in schools, especially cheaper and often not 
deeply trained adults, such as teacher aides.
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5. SUMMING UP THE DISTRACTORS
The issues discussed above dominate our 
debates about improving schools, but they do 
not improve student learning in any major way. 
Yes, many do have some kind of positive effects, 
but those effects are relatively low. Indeed, 
almost every intervention has some positive 
effect on student learning, so simply claiming 
that Policy A or B ‘works’ has little meaning. 
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of more than 
65,000 effect-sizes, gleaned from over 1,100 
meta analyses, representing approximately 
200 different kinds of education interventions 
and a quarter of a billion students who have 
been in some programme to enhance their 
achievement. Almost all effects are greater than 
zero – anything above zero means that the 
programme raised students’ levels of learning. 
Perhaps all you need to enhance learning is a 
pulse!
So while most ‘fixes’ can lead to increases in 
achievement (it is almost impossible not to), 
the effects are not profound. We love talking 
about the distractors that do not matter. And, 
as Table 5.1 shows, some of our most politically 
popular fixes rank near the bottom in terms of 
the effect they have on student achievement.
We can and should expect more – from our 
investments and for our children. In a separate 
paper I will turn to what does matter, what I 
call the politics of collaborative expertise, or, 
more simply, what works best in education.
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Figure 5.1 Relative ranking of a selection of popular education ‘fixes’, by effect size. 
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Rank Influence Effect-size
 91 Inquiry-based methods 0.31
140 Summer school 0.23
141 Finances 0.23
142 Religious schools 0.23
143 Individualised instruction 0.22
147 Class size 0.21
156 Co-/Team teaching 0.19
159 Within-class grouping 0.18
164 Matching style of learning 0.17
170 Mentoring 0.15
168 Problem-based learning 0.15
171 Ability grouping 0.12
175 Teacher education 0.12
177 Distance education 0.11
179 Changing school calendars/timetables 0.09
180 Detracking 0.09
183 Charter schools 0.07
184 Whole language 0.06
185 Diversity of students 0.05
187 Multi-grade/age classes 0.04
189 Volunteers/teacher aides 0.03
192 Open vs. traditional 0.01
194 Welfare policies −0.12
195 Retention −0.13
Table 5.1 The effect-sizes of many popular ‘fixes’ to the schooling system.
Source: Author’s own data.
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